




Speculation in asset market is modeled as a stochastic betting game of incomplete
information played by ﬁnite players and repeated inﬁnite times. With stochastic asset
return and unkown quality of public signal, a generic adaptive learning rule and the
corresponding evolutionary dynamics is analyzed. In the learning rule, the impact of
historical events on players’ belief decays over time. It is proved to be a robust approach
to adapt to stochastic regime shifts in the market over time. The market dynamics has
characteristics commonly observed in ﬁnancial market, i.e. endogenous boom-bust cycle,
positive correlation in return and volume series, and negative ﬁrst order autocorrelation
in return series, but inexplicable by conventional rational expectations theory.
Keywords: evolutionary games, adaptive learning, bounded rationality, behavioral ﬁ-
nance.
11 Introduction
Financial market is at the center stage of proﬁt-seeking and risk-taking in an ever changing
environment. Economic condition is volatile and volume of information is enormous. Specu-
lators come to the market with various presumptions and idiosyncratic characteristics. Only
the ﬁttest, with the acumen to discover changes in underlying rules and adapt, can endure
the market. Unlike traditional approach, which focuses on analyzing strategic behaviors of
market participants and ﬁnding equilibrium condition, this paper explores a new avenue and
shows how adaptive learning and evolution principle explains market dynamics.
Everybody wants to make money when come to trade in a ﬁnancial market. It is tru-
ely a zero-sum game: One’s gain is another’s loss. What makes a great investor, knowledge,
experience, skill, rationality, or something else? The famed speculator, George Soros, wrote
the following in Alchemy of Finance, a book summarizing essence of his life-long success in
trading and investment management.
As a money manager I was emotionally engaged in managing my fund. I managed
it as if my existence depended on it, as indeed it did. I relied on my instincts and
intuition as well as my conceptual framework to guide me through uncertainty.
......I was not well positioned to perform better than others if I had tried to
play the market by a particular set of rules: my competitive advantage lays in
recognizing changes in the rules of the game.
His fund delivered supernormal growth consistently, 3000 times the initial investment over a
twenty-eight year horizon. It is not likely to be a rare chance outcome. Soros identiﬁed his
investment decisions as emotional and instinctive. This account is rather to the contrary of
most literatures on ﬁnancial market.
Traditional rational expectations literature assumes that economic agents are fully
rational and derives equilibrium conditions to describe the market. In equilibrium market
price is eﬃcient in the sense that it aggregate all public and private information. However,
what drives market participants to seek costly information and how their speculation de-
pletes arbitrage opportunities is left untouched. Market microstructure literature emerged to
bridge this gap. It analyzes how agents with superior insider information will behave to proﬁt
from it at the cost of liquidity traders. It did not suppass rational expectations framework.
The concept of “insiders” and “liquidity traders” are introduced. Insiders are assumed to
2have superior information source and trade for proﬁt. Liquidity traders enter the market for
liquidity reasons. But it is not plausible to rely on liquidity reasons as a suﬃcient driver for
people to enter the market and perpetually take the wrong side of the trade.
After Internet bubble bursted, there is a growing volume of literature collecting evi-
dence of market anomalies such as bubbles and crashes. Findings in double auction theory
and the fact that more and more stock exchanges adopt electronic clearing system, it is
clear that pricing anomalies do not root in the market clearing mechanism itself. Besides
traditional reasons such as liquidity need, asset allocation, or trasaction cost, explanations
of those “abnormal” phenomena are oﬀered from new perspectives. It fuels a new wave of
investigation to challenge and re-examine assumptions in rational expectation models. These
research oﬀers an alternative explanation of market behaviors.
Many scholars try to explore possible leaks in information structure and rational-
ity assumptions. Bounded rationality approach relaxes the common knowledge assumption.
When the chain of inﬁnite depth of knowledge breaks in any link, there is possibility that the
entire empire may collapse and follow an entirely new path. Abreu and Brunnermier (2003)
shows that speculators cannot promptly coordinate private information and this delay in co-
ordination leads to a market bubble. Heterogenous belief approach explores trading behavior
induced from heterogenous prior belief. Harris and Arthur (1993) shows how trading volume
and change in price can result from diﬀerent opinion about economic fundamentals. David
(2005) explains equity premium by heterogenous belief among traders.
Psychological ﬁndings, especially Prospect Theory, opens the burgeoning ﬁeld of be-
havioral ﬁnance and oﬀers an alternative explaination of market anormalies. Barberis and
Thaler (2003) has a thorough review. Decision bias such as framing, mental accounting,
risk-seeking in loss and risk-averse in gain are applied to analyze ﬁnancial decision making.
The conventional symmetric concave utility function applied to aggregate wealth is being
challenged in this case.
This paper explores the territory of dynamic learning and adaption in ﬁnancial mar-
ket. The market is modeled under the dynamic learning and adjustment framework of Kan-
dori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). It relates to both bounded rationality
models and behavioral ﬁnance. We do not assume inﬁnite memory and boundless knowl-
edge so that strategic behaviors are present but limited. Similar to ﬁcticious play, market
participants apply a simple and intuitive strategy as a best response to the past when spec-
3ulating but not necessarily exploit all possible arbitrage opportunities. Based on research
ﬁndings in cognitive science, people overweight recent events and ignore distant events. A
simple adaptive learning rule encompassing this feature is proposed for speculators. Market
dynamics derived in this model resembles Best-Reponse Dynamics but is much less volatile.
In a stochasitc environment, pure strategy Nash equilibria does not exist and market evolves
with approximate probability distribution around intertemperal mixed strategy steady state.
In the next section, the model of a asset market with a single risky asset is presented.
It is simple enough to be tractable and rich enough to show the impact of adaptive learn-
ing and the role of evolution on market dynamics. Section 3 deﬁnes and discusses adaptive
learning rule. Section 4 introduces several evolutionary concepts and analyzes the consequent
market dynamics. Section 5 concludes with future extentions.
2 The Model
There are N potential speculators participating in the market with a single risky asset.
Trading of the risky asset occurs among speculators and a market maker at time t = 1,2,...
with equal time interval. In each round of trading, a public signal about the asset return is
announced to all market participants. Speculators then submit bids of the asset. The orders
are cleared by the market maker at a single clearing price. The realized risky asset value
becomes known and gains and losses are settled between parties taking opposite side of a
trade. The market advances to the next round of trading.





z, with probability 0.5,
−z, with probability 0.5,
where z > 0 and Dt is identical and independently distributed at diﬀerent time period.
The sequence (D1,D2,...,Dt,...) is thus a simple random walk. This feature simpliﬁes the
determination of market clearing price and dramatically reduces the number of states in the
market dynamics. The partial sum of the incremental change series is the value of the asset
at time t,




4If asset value hits zero, the asset will not be traded in the future. We assume that the
magnitude of increment z is very small compared with the initial asset value V0 so that zero
asset value is not likely to happen. Our analysis will focus on the change instead of the value
series.
Before bidding, speculators all observe a public signal ζt ∈ {−z,z}. It is common
knowledge. Denote the probability that the public signal is correct by,
φt = P(ζt = Rt).
We can easily verify that the public signal is either high or low with equal probability,
P(ζt = z) = P(Dt = z)P(ζt = Dt) + P(Dt = −z)P(ζt 6= Dt)
= 0.5φt + 0.5(1 − φt) = 0.5.
The correlation between the true asset value and the public signal at time t is,
Corr(ζt,Dt) = 2φt − 1.
If φt > 1/2, the public signal is of high quality and it is positively correlated with the real
asset return. The expected return of the asset at time t is,
E(Dt|ζt) = (2φt − 1)ζt.
The quality of public signal, φt, is neither publicly known or privately observed by any
market participants. There is an underlying Possion process N(t) with rate λ that reﬂects
the time when a change in the quality of public signal occurs. If N(tn) > N(tn−1), a change
happens between time tn−1 and tn and a new φt is randomly drawn from interval [0,1]. The
uncertainty in quality of public signal represents changes in public consensus due to changes
in fundamental economic structure. At the beginning of Internet era, new technology brought
new channels to disseminate information and new opportunities and there was less consensus
as to how much value the new technology would add to the economy.
Based on public signal, potential speculators decide whether to bid or not and if
to bid whether to take a long or short position. There is no short-selling constraint so
that speculators can take any position as they desire. For simplicity, it is assumed that
each speculator is allowed to buy or sell only one unit of the asset. There assures that
speculators have equal market inﬂuence. Buy or sell orders are all market orders, meaning
5that speculators are not allowed to condition their orders on a preset price threshold. After
bidding, the market marker clears all orders at price Pt given that there are xt buy orders
and yt sell orders,




Denote the change in price by Rt,




Change in asset price is proportional to the imbalance in buy and sell orders. When there are
more buy orders, the price at time t will be higher than the previous period. When there are
more sell orders, the price will be driven down. This pricing rule is similar in spirit to that
in Kyle (1985) except that the underlying return series is assumed to follow a random walk.
The market maker operates more like a automated clearing system than a proﬁt maximizer.
We assume that the market maker has no liquidity constraint. Since he does not need to
be compensated for liquidity risk, and there is no bid and ask spread nor strategic price
setting behavior. We further assume that positions are terminated at the end of each trading
round and proﬁt and loss from are accounted for among parties. If a speculator enters a long
position at time t, her payoﬀ at the end of this trading round will be −Pt+ζt. If a speculator
enters a short position at time t, her payoﬀ at the end of the trading round will be Pt − ζt.
There are two possible pure strategies that speculators can adopt, either to follow the
public signal or bet against it. We call the ﬁrst strategy “trend-following”, denoted by s1,
and the latter “contrarian”, s2, and denote the strategy set by S = {s1,s2}. When there
is a high signal, i.e. ζt = z, trend-followers will take a long position and contrarian will
take a short position in the risky asset. When there is a low public signal, i.e. ζt = −z,
trend-followers will take a short position and contrarian will take a long position in the risky
asset.
Let mt be the number of speculators adopting s1 at time t, mt ∈ {0,1,2,...,N}. Given
the realization of ζt, Dt, and mt in each round of trading, the market price and realized payoﬀ
of trend-followers and contrarians are shown in Table 1.
The market price is Pt = Pt−1 + z(2mt
N − 1) when ζt = z and Pt = Pt−1 − z(2mt
N − 1) when
ζt = −z. It can be expressed in a concise way as
Pt = Pt−1 + z(2
mt
N
− 1)(2χ{ζt=z} − 1). (1)
6Rt Πs1(mt) Πs2(mt)
ζt = z, Dt = z z(2mt
N − 1) 2z(1 − mt
N ) −2z(1 − mt
N )
ζt = −z, Dt = −z −z(2mt
N − 1) 2z(1 − mt
N ) −2z(1 − mt
N )
ζt = z, Dt = −z z(2mt
N − 1) −2z mt
N 2z mt
N
ζt = −z, Dt = z −z(2mt
N − 1) −2z mt
N 2z mt
N
Table 1: Price and Payoﬀ
Since outcome of Dt and public signal are both known after price is released, the proportion
of the population adopting each strategy is fully revealed and the number of trend-followers
mt is thus public information.
Trend-followers make a proﬁt if and only if public signal is correct. Contrarians are
the opposite. The magnitude of proﬁt or loss depends on the distribution in the current
population adopting each stategies. In the extreme, if the public signal is correct and all
speculators are trend-followers, they will earn zero proﬁt. If the public signal is correct and
there is only one trend-follower, his gain will be the largest ever, close to 2z. The outsized
gain is attributed to his correct judgement and the rest of the speculators’ wrong judgement.
Speculators face two uncertainties, the true quality of the public signal and distribution of
the current population adopting each strategies. The ﬁrst dictates the chance of winning and
the second determines the size of the reward. The expected payoﬀ of a trend-follower is,
E[Πs1(mt)] = 2z(1 −
mt
N














When the portion of trend-followers in the population is higher than the probability that the
public signal is correct, the trend-followers will take a loss and the contrarians will make a
proﬁt on average. It then follows.
Proposition 1 (Symmetric Baysian Nash Equilibrium): The symmetric Baysian
7Nash equilibrium in the speculation game is when speculators play strategy s1 with probability
φt and strategy s2 with probability 1 − φt.
The symmetric Baysian Nash equilibrium is satisfactory in projecting limiting be-
havior of speculators. However, it is unclear how such an equibrium can be acheived. When
the quality of the public signal φt is unkown and possibly change over time, it is not clear
how individual speculators can play exactly according to an unknown odd. The market will
be more often in a disequilibrium than in an equilibrium. In order to gain full perspective of
the market dynamics, it is therefore necessary to analyze how individual speculators learn of
the quality of public signal and how the market behaves as a result of this learning process.
As shown in Equation (2) and (3), a speculator’s expected payoﬀ from taking each
strategy dependes very much on the relationship between the true quality of public signal
and the behavior of the population. Since the true quality φt is unknown to the specula-
tor, she has to rely on her own belief to make a decision. Without further complication of
strategic behavior, we assume that speculators treat mt as the best prediction of number of
trend-followers at time t+1. Let θi
t denote speculator i’s belief of the public signal at time t.











The decision rule is to optimize the expected payoﬀs conditional on speculator’s individual
information set at time t. Call mt
N the population belief of public signal quality at time t.
Speculators always compare their own belief with the population belief to determine their
strategy in the next period. If θi
t > mt/N, speculator i will be better oﬀ being a trend
follower in the next round of trading. If θi
t < mt/N, she will be better oﬀ being a contrarian.
If the equality holds, it is assumed that speculator chooses the two strategies with equal
probability. Since belief space is a continuum, this assumption does not have much inﬂuence
on the market dynamics.
Before we move on to the discussion of learning and evolutionary dynamics, we will
prove eﬃciency of the pricing mechanism.
8Proposition 2 (Eﬃciency):
(1) The market price is informationally eﬃcient.
(2) Market maker adopting the above pricing mechanism expects zero proﬁt.
Proof of Proposition 2: Given xt buy orders and yt sell orders, the population belief of








The market clearing price changes by,
Pt − Pt−1 = z
xt − yt
xt + yt
= z(2ψt − 1),
which equals the expected asset value change given all public information,
E[Dt|θt = ψt] = z(2ψt − 1).
Therefore, the market price is weak form informationally eﬃcient. It can also be easily
checked that the expected proﬁt of the market maker is
E[Πt|θt = ψt] = (xt − yt)[ψt(−z + Pt) + (1 − ψt)(z + Pt)] = (xt − yt)((1 − 2ψt)z + Pt) = 0.
Q.E.D.
3 Adaptive Learning
Speculators’ action depends very much on their belief. Initially, they have a rough opinion
about the market. As they participate in trading, their belief are impacted by outcomes
of trading activities. In this section, we will propose and discuss the adaptive learning rule
based on ﬁndings in cognitive science. Compared with empirical mean widely adopted in
economic literature, adaptive learning rule emphasizes recent outcomes and overlooks distant
outcomes.
In general, learning can be represented by a belief updating process. speculator i
starts with an initial belief of the public signal quality, θi
0, i = 1,2,...N. She updates her











9where χ{Vt=ζt} is an indicator function, 0 ≤ ai
l(t) ≤ 1 for l = 0,1,2,...,, t = 0,1,2,...,, and
Pt
l=1 ai
l(t) = 1. This representation is generic. It does not make assumptions about the value
of the coeﬃcients except that current belief at time t is a weighted average of initial belief
and past outcomes. The weights at diﬀerent time on the same previous outcome or initial
belief could be diﬀerent, e.g ai
0(1) 6= ai
0(2). It only requires that weights are nonnegative
and sum to one at any time period. If the public signal is correct at time t, it will increase
speculator’s belief at time t and onwards. For simplilcity, denote χ{Vt=ζt} by χt.
If speculator i with initial belief θi















It assumes that all outcomes have equal inﬂuence on belief no matter when they occur. This
belief updating rule is used in most evolutionary game literature. Foster and Young (1990)
adopted a variant of this rule by assuming that players randomly select m out of n previous
outcomes and take the average as their belief. The randomness helps to prevent the game to
be locked into certain evolutionary unstable equilibrium without mutation.
Despite its popularity in game theory liturature, there are two major reasons to reject
the belief updating rule based on empirical mean. First, innovation and scientiﬁc discovery
bring structural changes to the economy from time to time. It is not reasonable to assume
that the underlying factors are homogenous across time and expect the future to follow the
pattern of long-dated outcomes to the same extent as near-dated outcomes. Rail road used
to be high growth sectors in 1900’s. It fueled the economy with cheaper means of mass
transportation and generated supernormal returns to equity investors. But as the expansion
reached boundary and new ways of transportation emgerged, the high return can no longer be
sustained. Automobile industry in the 1940’s, telephone in the 1960’s, and semiconductor in
the 1980’s all follow similar development pattern but their growth fell oﬀ the radar later on as
the industries mature. Recent data is thus more relevant to predict the near future. Second,
empirical studies in cognitive science have shown that ﬁrst impression and recent experience
has bigger mental impact and thus bigger inﬂuence on people’s belief than things happen in
the middle. This phenomenon was initially studied by Miller and Campbell in psychology
literature and fully researched in Shiﬀrin (1973). The bigger impact of ﬁrst impression is
termed “primacy eﬀect” and the discriminate emphasize on recent events is termed “recency
10eﬀect”.
In this paper, we will focus our attention on the “recency eﬀect” and formulate a
learning rule reﬂectng this property. The primacy eﬀect can be readily included in the
learning rule by adding another parameter on impact from initial periods. Since we are more
interested in adaptive behavior in a changing environment, we will use a simpler learning
rule without “primacy eﬀect”.
The model in Foster and Young (1990) has “recency eﬀect” feature, too. At the end of
each period, the oldest outcome is droped and the recent outcome is added to the state of the
dynamics so that there are only a ﬁxed number n of outcomes in the history of events. Then
m out of the n outcomes in the history queue will be picked randomly for each agent. The
length of the history queue is a crucial assumption, which determines the number of states of
the game and the dynamics over time. However, both n and m have to be arbitrarily chosen
in order for the game to have a clear deﬁnition of states. The following speciﬁcation is not
restrictive in that sense and allows individuality in cognitive process and assumes only the
general functional form.
Deﬁnition: Speculator i updates her belief according to an adaptive learning rule if the
new belief is a weighted average of previous belief and current outcome with constant αi as
weight on previous belief, i.e.
θi
t = (1 − αi)χt−1 + αiθi
t−1 (6)





The weight αi in an adaptive learning rule represents speculator i’s responsiveness
to new information. Like gene of a species in ecological evolution, a speculator’s responsive-
ness is an inherited characteristic. It is type of speculator i and does not vary over time
or depends on outcomes of the game. If αi = 1, speculator i is absolutely strong in initial
belief and totally ignores subsequent signal outcomes. If αi = 0, speculator i’s belief depends
solely on the previous round’s signal accuracy. If 0 < αi < 1, the inﬂuence of initial be-
lief and outcomes in earlier rounds of trading will gradually phase out over time and recent
outcomes have bigger impact on speculator i’s current belief. It is the “recency eﬀect” feature.
Proposition 3 (Biasedness and Nonconvergence in Static Environment): If quality
of public signal φt stays at a constant φ over time and given 0 < αi, the belief series derived
11from the adaptive learning rule
(1) is a biased estimate of the true quality of public signal and;
(2) will not converge to the true quality of public signal when t goes to inﬁnity.




(αi)l = 1 − (αi)t (8)
Taking expectation of Equation (7),
E(θi










= (1 − (αi)t)φ + (αi)tθi
0
Speculator i’s belief at time t, θi
t, is thus a biased estimate of φ. It is unbiased only if θi
0 = φ.
The estimation bias at time t is (αi)t(θi
0 − φ). It decreases over time. In the limit as t goes
to inﬁnity, the impact of initial belief approaches zero and E(θi




t→∞(1 − (αi)t)φ + lim
t→∞(αi)tθi
0 = φ.
It can be shown that the variance of the adaptive learning belief at time t is
V ar(θi








= φ(1 − φ)
1 − αi
1 + αi(1 − (αi)2t).





t) = φ(1 − φ)
1 − αi
1 + αi,
therefore the adaptive learning belief series does not converge in probability to φ.
Q.E.D.
The empirical mean is also biased. Its estimation bias at time t is 1
1+t(θi
0 − φ). The bias
reduces over time. Empirical mean does not converge to the true quality of public signal in
12the limit unless ai(0) = 0. The variance of belief based on empirical mean at time t is
V ar(θi




The empirical mean belief series converges to 0 as time approaches inﬁnity. By Strong Law
of Large Numbers, the empirical mean belief series converges to φ in probability.
As shown before, the belief series generated from this rule does not converge to the
true quality of public signal and has a larger variance in the limit than the empirical mean.
But It has an advantage when the game is set with structural shifts.
Proposition 4: Assume that the change in quality of public signal φt occurs at time
(T1,T2,...,Tn,...) and the number of changes at time t, N(t), is a Poisson process with pa-
rameter λ. Given 0 < αi, there exists time T, such that for all t > T, the expected belief
series derived from the adaptive learning rule is closer to φt than that of the empirical mean
belief series, conditional on, FTn, the information set at Tn, where Tn is the last time before



















χl − φt|FTn] (9)
Proof of Proposition 4: It is a property of Poisson process that the average time lapse
from a change in the quality of public signal to the next is 1/λ,
E[Tn+1 − Tn|Tn] = 1/λ.







then for any t > T,




Notice that the left hand side of Condition (10) is sum of the k most recent belief weights in
adaptive learning rule and the right hand side is that in empirical mean. For any t > T, in
the adaptive learning rule total belief weight on outcomes happened after the recent change
13in quality of public signal is thus larger than that in empirical mean. Since E[χl] = φl = φTn





0 − φt|FTn] = (1 − αi)
t−1 X
l=t−Tn

























The model with adaptive learning feature distinguishes itself from Stochasitic Fictitious Play
and the Adaptive Play model of Young (1993). In this section, we will focus on implication
of adaptive learning on market dynamics.
Let θt denote the vector of speculators’ belief, (θ1
t,θ2
t,...,θN
t ). As explained before,
the clearing price Pt and realized outcome of the public signal and asset value fully reveal
the proportion of population adopting each strategies at time t. In other words, mt is public
information before bidding begins at time t + 1. The state of the game at time t is a tuple
< θt,mt >. For speculator i, she knows only her own belief θi
t but not the others’. Also
speculators do not have perfect recall of past outcomes. The past impacts speculators’ fu-
ture actions only through belief. Therefore, speculator i’s information set at time t is (θi
t,mt).
Deﬁnition: Let S = {s1,s2,...,sK} denote the set of pure strategies. Let δt be the popula-














t ). The mapping b : (∆,Θ) → (∆,Θ) represents an evolutionary dy-
namic.
An evolutionary dynamic is composed of a belief updating rule and choice decision
of pure strategies based on belief at each point in time. The system evolves from one state
14to another according to the mapping b(.). If the transition probability is determined, the
evolutionary dynamics can be represented by a Markov chain. We have deﬁned the belief up-
dating rule and strategy choice rule for this model, the dynamics are hence fully determined
given an initial state.
To show characteristics of the evolutionary dynamics in this model, we introduce the
concept of payoﬀ monotonic evolutionary dynamic.
Deﬁnition: An evolutionary dynamic is payoﬀ monotonic if in the next period the
proportion of population adopting a higher payoﬀ strategy is at least as large as that adopting
a lower payoﬀ strategy in the current period. Mathematically,








t , ∀ k,l ∈ {1,2,...,K}
where δt+1 = b(δt).
In the setting of this model, payoﬀ monotone means that if strategy j generated
higher payoﬀ in the previous round of trading then the proportion of speculators adopting
strategy j in the next round is non-decreasing.
Theorem 1 (Payoﬀ Monotonicity): If ∃i ∈ {1,2,...,N}, s.t. αi > 0, the decision
rule in the speculating game is payoﬀ monotone.
Proof of Theorem 1: We claim that if trend-following was the higher payoﬀ strategy at
time t, then there will be at least as many trend-followers at time t+1 as before. To see this,
ﬁrst note that for any speculator i with αi > 0,
θi
t+1 = αiχ{Vt=ζt} + (1 − αi)θi
t > θi
t,
since χ{Vt=ζt} = 1. If trend-following generated higher payoﬀ at time t, any speculator i
with αi > 0 have belief θi
t > mt
N . They will either continue to be a trend-follower at time





t. His strategy will not change. Therefore our claim is valid. It can be easily
proved that if contrarian is the higher payoﬀ strategy at time t, there will be at least as many
contrarians at time t+1 as before. This completes the proof that the decision rule is payoﬀ
monotone.
15Q.E.D.
When αi = 1 for all i = 1,2,...N, the above belief updating rule will generate the Best-
Response dynamics. If a speculator previously followed the public signal and it turned out to
be correct, she will be a trend-follower in the next round. Otherwise, they will be contrarians.
Similarly, contrarians will bid against the public signal in the next round if they won and
become trend-followers if they lost in the previous round.
Note that payoﬀ monotone does not necessarily imply that the strategy distribution
with that property will converge to the symmetric Baysien Nash equilibrium. In this game,
due to speculators’ myopic emphasis of the most recent outcomes, their choice of strategies
will be myopic.
Deﬁnition: Given that the state of the game is (θt,mt),
a marginal contrarian is a speculator with belief, θi
t < mt
N , whose belief updating weight αi
is such that
(1 − αi)θt
i + αi ≥
mt
N






a marginal trend-follower is a speculator with belief, θi
t > mt
N , whose belief updating weight
αi is such that
(1 − αi)θt
i + αi ≤
mt
N






A marginal contrarian will become a trend-follower at time t+1 if the public signal
is correct at time t. Any contrarian at time t with belief θi
t and a belief updating weight
less than the marginal contrarian with the same belief will still be a contrarian at time t+1
even if the signal is correct at time t. Similarly, a marginal trend-follower will become a
contrarian at time t+1 if the public signal is incorrect at time t. Any trend-follower at time
t with belief θi
t and a belief updating weight less than the marginal trend-follower with the
same belief will still be a trend-follower at time t+1 even if the signal is incorrect at time t.
For each value of the individual belief θ∗, there is a cutoﬀ value of belief updating
weight, αC(θ∗), that solely determines whether a contrarian with this belief will possibly





16The cutoﬀ value αC(θ∗) is a convex and increasing function of θ∗. It is also increasing in mt.
Similarly, there is a cutoﬀ value of belief updating weight, αT(θ∗), that solely determines





The cutoﬀ value αT(θ∗) is a convex and decreasing function of θ∗. It is a decreasing function
in mt. Figure (??)shows an example of αC(θ∗) and αT(θ∗).
Given state of the game < θt,mt >, denote the number of marginal contrarians at
time t by MCt and the number of marginal trend-followers by MTt. Since the game has
ﬁnite number of players, it is possible that either MCt or MTt is 0 from time to time. If at
time t, the public signal is correct, ζt = Dt, then speculator i’s belief will be updated, θi
t+1 =
αi + (1 − αi)θi
t. It also drives marginal contrarians to switch strategy, mt+1 = mt + MCt.
If at time t, the public signal is incorrect, i.e. ζt 6= Dt, then speculator i’s belief θt+1 will
be decreased to θi
t+1 = −αi + (1 − αi)θi
t. It also drives marginal trend-followers to switch






t+1 = αi(2χ{ζt=z} − 1) + (1 − αi)θi
t for i=1,2,...N (11)
mt+1 = mt + χ{ζt=z}MCt + (χ{ζt=z} − 1)MTt. (12)
Deﬁne ¯ α =
PN
i=1 αi to be the average belief updating weight. Since αi ≥ 0, for all
i, ¯ α ≥ 0. Whenever the public signal is correct, speculators’ belief of the quality of the
public signal increases by a ﬁxed amount both at individual and population level. Likewise,
whenever the public signal is incorrect, speculators’ belief of the quality of the public signal
decreases by a ﬁxed amount both at individual and population level.
When state of the game moves to < θt+1,mt+1 >, price at time t+1 will be aﬀected
by change in belief as well. As shown in Equation (1), state of the dynamics aﬀects price
Pt+1 through mt+1. The absolute belief updating impact on price is 2z MCt
N when the public
signal is correct and 2z MTt
N when the public signal is incorrect at time t. Because MCt and
MTt are both state dependent, the impact on price is state dependent.
Theorem 2 (Extreme Aversion): The evolutionary dynamics stays at extreme states
(with one strategy dominating the population) less often than moderate states.
17Proof of Theorem 2: The cutoﬀ value of marginal contrarian’s belief updating weight,
αC(θi), is increasing in the diﬀerence between her own belief and the population belief,
|θi− mt
N |. The cutoﬀ value of marginal trend-follower’s belief updating weight, αT(θj), is also
increasing in |θj − mt
N |. When the state is at mt, assume there is a marginal contrarian with
belief θi
C and belief updating weight αC(θi
C). Denote the distance between this marginal
contrarian’s belief and the population belief by d = |θi
C − mt
N |. A marginal trend-follower j
whose belief is as close to the population belief as that of the marginal contrarian will have






When there are more trend-followers in the market, i.e. a higher mt > mt, belief
of the marginal contrarian with θi
C = mt + d and belief of the marginal trend-follower with
θ
j













is decreasing in θi
C. Holding d








It implies that when there are more existing trend-followers in the market, contrarians will
be less inclined to switch strategy than trend-followers. The reverse holds when there are
more contrarians. The evolutionary dynamic is therefore less likely to be at extreme states
when mt is either close to 0 or N.
Q.E.D.
Theorem 3 (Boom-Bust Cycle): The price series in this market exhibits boom-bust
cycle.
Proof of Theorem 3: As shown in the dynamics of Equation (eq:eq2) and (eq:eq3),
consecutive correct public signals increase price well as belief. The oppotimism as reﬂected
in belief elevates price increment further. When a incorrect public signal occurs afterwards,
the price down turn is bigger than if there are no previous favorable outcomes. The reverse is
true when there are consecutive incorrect public signals. Consequently, belief is endogeneous
force that generates boom-bust cycle in price.
Q.E.D.
185 Conclusion and Further Extension
In this paper, we introduced a model of ﬁnancial market with dynamic adaptive learning.
Speculators are inherited with idiosyncratic characters and learn of the stochastic quality of
public signal. They are passive in the sense that their reaction to market events are deter-
mined by heredity instead of personal will. They are active in the sense that they try to beat
the market and make a proﬁt. It is a reﬂection of emotional behavior human beings instead of
fully rational optimizers. This is the ﬁrst attempt to model these aspects of ﬁnancial market.
From the modelling point of view, the simple market order trading mechanism cir-
cumvents the usual cumbersome assumptions. Speculation is driven by heterogenous belief
and dynamic learning. Nobody expects themselves to lose on average and still trade. At
the same time, speculators adopt all pure strategies and market maker sets market clearing
price without information scooping. The market clearing price is informationally eﬃcient and
does not involve complication of strategic interactions. As we have seen that as a result of
adaptive learning price ﬂuctuates irrespective economic fundamentals and boom-bust cycles
are endogenous.
There are several directions worth further exploration. In the current model, the only
information source is an exogenous public signal. It will be interesting to see how inclusion
of speculators with private information on asset value will impact the market dynamic. Also
current model has not touched elimination rule that represents the priciple of “survival of the
ﬁttest.” To introduce wealth constraints to eliminate inept speculators and show the evolu-
tionary impact on public learning and market dynamics will be the next step. In that case,
public signal could be the public belief revealed by market clearing price and endogenized.
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